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Abstract
Recent research in three Southern states supplied data describing the role community structure
and culture played in shaping public response to tornado risks. The following study identifies and
describes how residents received, made sense of, and ultimately used information to make decisions
about responding to warnings. In addition to a range of theoretical concerns, research was also
intended to develop a set of safety policies derived from what the data reveals about the social
psychology of risk perception, economic constraints to shelter, and the cultural aspects of response.
Data analysis reveals a diverse set of social factors governing community response to tornado
warnings, including social networks, language, issues in comprehension, siren ambiguities, false
alarms, tornado tracking, local business behaviors, warning specificity, and cultural myths.
KEYWORDS: warnings, tornados, public response, social psychology
Author Notes: This work was supported in part by the Engineering Research Centers Program
of the National Science Foundation under NSF Cooperative Agreement No. EEC-0313747. Any
inquiries regarding this paper should be directed to William Donner via e-mail at
William.Donner@iup.edu
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INTRODUCTION
Despite advances in warning technologies, tornadic deaths and injuries still occur
with troubling regularity. The 2011 tornado season was the 4th most deadly in
U.S. history and also holds the distinction of causing the 2nd highest number of
injuries (Storm Prediction Center 2012.) Revealed in these statistics is a need for
more research on the social and psychological factors at play in the warning
response process. Past research identifies those factors most commonly linked to
warning response, but there are few studies that do so using a qualitative approach
to data collection and analysis. The following study attempts to describe in detail
the common processes associated with response to tornadic events in three
Southern states during the 2007 storm season. What stands out in these processes
is a fundamental connection to community culture and structure, revealing the
profound social nature of warning response. Consequently, research and policy
efforts should focus on behaviors rooted in the social and cultural realities of
communities rather than on those of a more random or idiosyncratic nature. This
study uses data from interviews within communities recently under tornado
warnings to understand how individuals respond to and make use of warning
information. Based on this understanding, the study also offers a set of policy
guidelines to inform policymakers on issues of warning accessibility, decision
making, and other matters.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Modern research into risk and disasters has moved beyond the idea that people
naturally respond to threats. McLuckie remarks (1973: n.p.): “In developing a
warning system, a number of personal and social influences affecting those being
warned must be considered.” Empirical research has largely confirmed this
assertion. Demographic characteristics, such as education (Balluz et. al. 2000),
gender (Bateman and Edwards 2002), and income (Edwards 1993), may shape
response to disaster threats. Similarly, one’s connection (or lack thereof) to social
networks may also play a role in how individuals respond to warnings. An earlier
study by Drabek and Stephenson (1971) shows that families that were together
during a flood were more likely to respond to warnings. Moreover, family
decisions to evacuate or seek shelter often shape individual decisions (Gladwin,
Gladwin, and Peacock 2001). Apart from social characteristics, the literature also
asserts a strong link between human psychology and risk. Studies routinely
demonstrate the importance of warning specificity (Lindell and Perry 1987; Mileti
and Beck 1975), consistency (Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1992), familiarity (Lindell
and Perry 1987), and credibility (Peters, Covello, and McCallum 1997) to the
process of responding to natural and technological hazards.
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Finally, social networks have been found to have some influence on the
reception of tornado information (Kirschenbaum 1992). Scholars have found that
a strong connection to primary or secondary social networks increases the
probability of message reception. Frequent interaction of family members
(Lardry and Rogers 1982), strong community or network involvement (Rogers
and Sorenson 1991), and regular association with a subculture or voluntary
association (Perry, Lindell, and Greene 1981) led to higher rates of warning
reception among individuals. Therefore, recent migrants may be at greatest risk
due to disconnection from information networks. In many cases, factors ranging
from language barriers to a distrust of authorities make the presence of informal
organizations such as churches necessary for the transmission of warning
information to at-risk groups. This may especially be true for immigrants isolated
from the community at large, finding themselves unable to receive or understand
warning information in the absence of alternative social networks.
Despite a large number of studies on the topic of warning response, few
attempts have been made to unite these findings into a general model.
Nevertheless, an exception to this has emerged in several studies, most notably in
the work of Mileti and Sorenson (1990), as well as Lindell and Perry (1992).
Through the examination and synthesis of the literature, they advance a number of
formal statements on warning systems.
Mileti and Sorenson (1990) characterize warnings as complex systems
with three sub-systems: 1) the detection subsystem, involving the monitoring,
collection, and assessment of the environment; 2) the management subsystem,
encompassing the interpretation, use, and coordination of data; and 3) the
response subsystem, comprising the processes by which the public receives,
understands, and responds to information. According to these researchers, the
response sub-system, the system with which we are primarily concerned, is
composed of six major processes: 1) hearing the warning, 2) understanding, 3)
believing, 4) personalizing, 5) deciding and responding, and finally 6) confirming.
In his book, Disasters by Design, Mileti (1999) adapts Lindell and Perry’s (1992)
response model to prior research by Mileti and Sorenson (1990), resulting in a
model that includes how and whether safety resources are accessed. Past
research, for instance, shows an individual’s decision and ability to respond is
strongly tied to the availability of resources (Duval and Mulilis 1999).
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
Sampling Strategy
The data collection strategy for this study involved a synthesis of purposive and
snowball sampling applied at several stages throughout the sampling process. In
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qualitative research, Creswell (2007) notes that the purpose of the study must
drive sample selection with the aim of obtaining different perspectives. Purposive
sampling directs researchers to sample respondents whose interviews address
empirically and theoretically important issues. One point of view in this study,
for instance, was that of Hispanics or Latinos/as, the inclusion of whom was made
possible by identifying areas in which they made up a significant part of the local
population (identified through Census records). These purposive sampling
techniques were driven by the literature and guided decisions in the early stages
of the sampling process, but in-field selection of participants was governed by a
convenience and snowball sampling approach. Consequently, sampling was a
two-fold process. First, research sites were chosen on the basis of two conditions:
the presence of tornados and the issuance of a warning. Absent either condition,
areas were removed from the sample space. If a community experienced both a
tornado and a warning, attempts were made to interview members of minority
communities, women, the elderly, and the disabled (constituting the purposive
element of the sampling strategy). Researchers visited these areas to acquire
information on these groups. Once in these communities, a combination of
snowball and purposive sampling was used to generate the sample.
Close attention was paid to the meteorological, geographic, and
demographic characteristics of regions when selecting study locations. In the
event that storms were likely in the continental United States, national and local
news stations (CNN, MSNBC, The Weather Channel, etc.) were monitored for
the likelihood, location, and intensity of tornadoes. If tornadoes did occur, this
information was compared to Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Storm Report data,
which are made available promptly after the majority of storms. Using these data,
ArcView GIS was used to map where the tornadoes occurred, their potential path,
and their intensities. Latitudes and longitudes of each event specified through
SPC observations (based on local observations) were subsequently overlaid on
corresponding shapefiles downloaded from the U.S. Census website. On these
shapefiles we plotted (again using latitudes and longitudes) local communities
with the purpose of selecting populations at varying distances from each specific
tornado. This afforded researchers the opportunity to choose communities at
varying levels of threat, allowing for greater variation in the experiences of
interviewees in the dataset. For instance, those at a distance from event would be
far less likely to experience direct environmental cues, which have been shown to
influence response patterns among the public.
Data Collection Tool
The principal data collection tool in the study was an interview guide. In-depth
interviews were designed around Mileti’s synthesized model of warning response,
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intending to capture core concepts such as warning credibility, comprehension of
warnings, barriers to response, perceptions of tornado risk, perceptions of
appropriate behavior, and so on. Thus, questions such as “how did you receive
warning information” and “did you believe the warning was true” were used to
explore these theoretical ideas.
Specifically, the data collection tool included open-ended questions
addressing:
•
•
•
•
•

How and under what conditions watches, warnings, and tornado
information were received
Whether and how weather information was understood
Whether and how weather information was believed
Whether and how weather information was confirmed
How respondents formulated the ultimate need to take action and
rationalizations for needing and using resources (e.g., shelters).

The open-ended structure of the guide allowed researchers to probe for
additional information during the interview. Interviews took place in a variety of
locations, including interviewee's homes, restaurants, and public buildings. The
duration of the interviews ranged from approximately 15 minutes to 1 hour in
length, and all interviews were recorded and later transcribed by trained research
assistants.
Results were initially coded using the seven stages previously
mentioned and later coded more specifically. For instance, if an interviewee
misunderstood a warning because they did not speak English, this was initially
coded as "2" and later coded as "Spanish/Multiple Languages." All interviewees
were informed of IRB-required information, including the study’s goals, intended
number of interviewees, and survey length. The resulting data set offered
researchers insights into the depth and complexity of the warning response
process. Also inferred from these data were numerous policy recommendations,
with excerpts from the transcripts included where further illumination of the
authors’ remarks was needed. These recommendations are presented below (for a
more theoretical presentation of the findings, see Donner 2007).
Discussion of Research Sites
Research was conducted from February until April 2006, during which time three
separate tornado events in Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee were studied.
Researchers interviewed warning recipients across New Orleans and the
surrounding Jefferson parish in southern Louisiana; cities and towns in the areas
surrounding Springfield, Missouri; and communities in the immediate region of
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Dyersburg, Tennessee. These efforts resulted in the following sample sizes: New
Orleans, LA (n=21), Springfield, MO (n=20), and Dyersburg, TN (n=14).
New Orleans. On February 14, 2006, several strong tornados struck the
city, as well as its surrounding suburbs and towns, causing significant damage to
an already devastated region. The majority of the destruction--as a result of two
or three F1 tornadoes--occurred in Kenner and Metairie; the former is a western
suburb of New Orleans, where significant damage had been done to the Louis
Armstrong International Airport by Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans offered a
unique site in which to conduct research, given the great cultural, social, and
economic diversity in this area. Research sites included New Orleans and the
more suburban communities of Kenner and Hahnville. Interviews took place on
February 21-26th, 2006. Interestingly, it should be noted that, although several of
those interviewed were still living in personal or FEMA trailers, few respondents
made specific links between how they responded to the tornadoes and Hurricane
Katrina. Indeed, Hurricane Katrina, despite striking New Orleans mere months
prior to the study, was rarely mentioned during the interviews.
Missouri. From March 9 through March 12th, 2006, a major tornado
outbreak occurred in the Central United States. During the outbreak, over 105
(one of which was confirmed as an F4) tornadoes were spawned from the
supercell, causing extensive damage across the region. Specifically targeted for
fieldwork was Verona, MO, a community with a sizable Hispanic population.
Research sites included the communities of Fordland, Republic, Battlefield, Nixa,
Marionville, and Verona in Missouri. Interviews were conducted during April
15-17th, 2006.
Tennessee. Research in Tennessee was conducted on tornadoes that struck
the region on April 2, 2006, in Western Tennessee, where an F3 tornado was
confirmed. The research sites included the cities of Millsfield, Newbern, and
Caruthersville, MO, which lies near the border of Tennessee. Interviews took
place during June 2-3rd, 2006.
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Table 1: Demographics of Sampled Communities (2000 Census)
ST

% Latin

Med Age

%HS
Grad

Kenner
New Orleans

LA

72874*

25*

13.6

35.6*

81.1*

11

Hahnville

LA

437186*

67.5*

3.1*

35.2*

82.3*

21.8*

LA

2,792*

50.9*

1.1*

34.2*

75.5*

19.8*

MO

12,124

0.5

1.3

31.9

88.5

8.1

MO

2,385

0.2

1.2

32

90.1

1.5

MO

8,438

0.2

1

33.3

82.2

5.8

MO

2,113

0.1

0.6

38.5

75.6

19.5

MO

684

0

1.6

34.3

79.4

4.8

MO

714

1.5

31

30.8

60.4

19.4

2,988

12.3

12.5

33.9

80.4

9.2

Nixa
Battlefield
Republic
Marionville
Fordland
Verona
Millsfield
Newbern

% AfricanAmerican

%Fam

Population
Total

Pov

n/a
TN

* Estimate prior to Katrina. Possibly not accurate estimate of population at the time of study, especially in
Kenner and New Orleans.

OBSERVED PATTERNS OF PUBLIC RESPONSE
Social Networks
In addition to receiving information from formal warnings (e.g., sirens), results
from interviews suggest that interviewees received information through informal
(i.e., family, friends, and co-workers) channels as well. If informal information
represents a primary source of warning for some people, it would be useful, from
a policy perspective, to consider what kinds of people informal information is
least likely to reach. It follows naturally that groups outside social networks are
expected to be less likely to receive warning information.
The data reveal much about the nature of informal information seeking
during periods of warning. Such was the case in the study site of Verona, MO,
where local churches channeled warning information to a sizable and growing
Hispanic population. This observation is consistent with the literature, which
suggests that Latinos, due to language and social barriers, often have limited
access to formal community resources (Eisenman et al. 2009). Exploring the case
of Verona somewhat further, a local Honduran priest often became, during
periods of warning, something of an informal emergency manager for the
community’s sizable Hispanic population. This was because many Hispanics in
the community could not understand warnings communicated in English and were
unable to communicate with English-speaking members of the community. As a
result, many sought information from the priest during severe storms. His
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authority as a church figure made him an important source of warnings, weather
information, and shelter assistance during the storms. Even when absent from the
community, the priest still received numerous calls from local Hispanics about the
possibility of severe weather in the area. What is more, social networks also
played a key role in the sheltering phase; without basements or adequate shelters,
many in the Verona Hispanic community used the priest's house as a shelter.
Care should be taken, however, to avoid assuming that such communities
are helpless—indeed, far from it. Emergency managers must determine if what
these groups have decided to do is effective and, if so, facilitate these preexisting
informal response strategies instead of changing them. Attempting to transform
successful—albeit admittedly unofficial—methods of adaptation in the
community will at best accomplish nothing or, at worst, reverse those safety gains
already achieved.
While strong social connections helped to protect Hispanics in Verona, the
absence of social networks presents increasing problems for elderly and disabled
populations, who may find themselves increasingly isolated from community
networks. The following description of an elderly man in Missouri demonstrates
how growing older may disrupt one’s social networks and therefore leave an
individual more vulnerable: “DM: So did you talk about it all with your
neighbors, beforehand, that you knew it [the tornado] was coming? A: No. We
got, in this particular community right here, I believe that lady is gone, the next
house, they’re pretty much shut-ins, the next few houses are all empty, so in fact
that lady down there died just a couple weeks ago... and the next two people,
they’re, like I said, we’re the youngest folks here. And he’s on oxygen and doesn’t
get out very much and this lady over here broke her hip, she’s in the hospital, so
really there wasn’t, you know” [QR-MO-9].
Spanish/Multiple Languages
Researchers have observed difficulty among minority groups in understanding
warnings due to language barriers (Aguirre 1988). Responding to a warning
implies that one has both received a warning and understood the nature of the risk
communicated in the warning. Some warning recipients may only generally
understand the warning and misinterpret the true level of risk, location of threat,
or recommended courses of action. The following conversation with a Hispanic
resident of Verona tells of the difficulties faced by a large population of nonEnglish speaking Latinos during periods of warning in the small community:
BD: Okay. Okay. When they issue tornado warnings … what percent of the Hispanics
around here, do you think, speak English?
A: 20 %
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BD: About 20%?
A: Yes.
BD: So when the National Weather Service or the local news issues tornado warnings,
how do …
A: The people don’t understand.
BD: They don’t understand?
A: They don’t understand… [on the] television or the radio, say tornado watch or
whatever- the people don’t understand.

Understanding of Warnings and Watches
Some interviewees could not fully grasp the difference between watches and
warnings; others understood only the general meanings of these very different
forms of information. If the public is unable to differentiate between watches and
warnings, this will have an impact on their response (or lack thereof) to warnings.
Public education campaigns should focus on these differences, taking special care
to differentiate between: a) the sequence of watches and warnings (watches come
first); b) the level of risk warnings and watches are intended to convey; and c) the
different meteorological conditions with which warnings and watches are
associated. As one interviewee remarked, “I am a nurse, but I don’t really
completely understand the difference that much between a watch and a warning,
and one doesn’t mean more to me than the other” [QR-MO-2]. It remains
possible that the technical definitions of the two terms are confusing to warning
recipients. A potential alternative explanation is that the definitions of warnings
and watches rarely enter the minds of residents at times when they are not in
effect. Respondents told interviewers that severe weather was something that was
rarely thought about on a regular basis—especially outside of storm season.
Without a sense of immediacy and threat, there is little incentive to learn and
remember the subtle—yet important—distinctions between the alerts. Interviews
seem to further suggest public misunderstanding of the technical meanings of
NWS warning terminology.
Siren Confusion and Misperceptions
One would assume that sirens offer a clear and unequivocal warning, and in many
cases this is true. However, in other situations, clarity can be lost in the presence
of multiple possible threats (e.g., tornadoes, chemical spills, hurricanes) for which
a single-toned siren is tasked. For example, among the general population in one
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community, whose single-toned sirens could signal the presence of a tornado,
hurricane, or chemical leak, considerable confusion emerged even within
households. A husband and wife debated the meanings of local sirens in one
interview:
B (Wife): There’s a different sound for chemicals, aren’t there, [husband’s name]? It’s a
different.
A (Husband): I don’t know, it’s just an emergency siren.
B: It’s an emergency siren, you turn to the local T.V. and they’s supposed to…
A: I don’t know that there’s a different sound, I don’t think it does [QR-NO-19].

Interestingly, the single-tone, multiple-event system further encourages
the well-documented tendency among warning recipients to confirm warnings
(Mileti 1999), yet concerns arise that this may simply delay overall response time.
According to the literature, individuals who feel threatened and receive warnings
generally seek further validation regarding the credibility of the warning. The net
result is delaying individual response, which, in the context of rapid-onset events
such as tornadoes, could be fatal. Multiple-tone sirens add further layers of
ambiguity to the response process and thus encourage the need for additional
confirmation among communities, which in turn delays response.
If possible, single-tone, multiple-event sirens should be eliminated. Even
jurisdictions unable to opt for more effective warning systems can take actions to
improve the effectiveness of these siren systems by considering the causes of the
public’s confusion. (That many communities cannot do without single-tone
multiple-event systems has not escaped the authors’ perception.) We realize that
much of this policy stems from the demands of multiple hazards in communities
often too poor to install multiple systems. Alternatives can often be very
expensive. In communities unable to escape the use of such systems, what might
possibly counteract this confusion is the use of police or fire department personnel
directly announcing the threat type to the communities at risk of being impacted
by the hazard event. Of course, education, training, and raising the awareness of
the general public is also essential. This would allow emergency managers to
reach a broader population and present a clearer picture of the risk the community
is facing. Some additional means of conveying what type of threat is present that
would not require the community to confirm for prolonged or unnecessary periods
of time could have a significant and positive impact on public safety.
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False Alarms
Interviewees appeared concerned about false alarms. One Missouri resident
remarks, "We don’t get a lot of false alarms around here…our sirens don’t go off
real often. If they went off all the time, that would be a bad thing" [QR-MO-8].
When asked about the frequency of false alarms, another interviewee replied,
"Just about every day here, I mean here lately" [QR-TN-10].
Why were
interviewees so concerned with the false alarm rate? The public, emergency
managers (EM), and the National Weather Service (NWS) appear to hold
different definitions of what constitutes a false alarm. For the NWS, a warning
might be false if a tornado fails to enter a geographic warning polygon. The
public, on the other hand, holds a much more subjective definition of warnings: a
watch, warning, or siren sounded without the clear presence of a tornado may be
regarded as "false." For instance, one interviewee complained, "The siren goes
off so many times, we had sirens go off and a tornado nowhere near us, it was in
Dyersburg" [QR-TN-11].
Thus, from the interviewee’s perspective, he
experienced a "false alarm" although a tornado did indeed occur.
From the interviews, it would seem that the public uses value judgments,
past experience, and discussion with others to assess the false alarm rate. Even
when the mathematical probability of a tornado touchdown is high, if the public
does not immediately experience the tornado, some within the community may
define this as a false alarm. Emergency managers are thus faced with a problem:
even if the data suggest the need for a warning, if no tornado appears, the
community may label the siren a "false alarm," which may have implications for
future response. Whether false alarms truly have a negative impact on behavior
finds mixed support in the scientific literature, but findings from the current study
suggest some influence on warning response. In the end, officials and
policymakers must come to terms with a public whose perceptions of the false
alarm rates may be vastly different from “official” or NWS definitions.
Thus, the question remains as to how false alarms influence community
response. In some studies, there is support for the hypothesis that a high rate of
false alarms leads to disbelief of warnings; other studies, however, challenge this
view. (For an illustration of the debate, see Dow and Cutter 1998; Atwood and
Major 1998; Breznitz 1984.) In the current study, false alarms did not lead to
inaction; interviewees responded to warnings ultimately. False alarms, however,
prolonged the time taken to respond. This point is precisely illustrated in the
following statement made by an interviewee in Tennessee: "You get warnings,
you [get] used to ‘em. And you just don’t, you know, that’s why I come outside
and I watch for the... signs" [QR-TN-11].
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Tornado Tracking
It appears from many of the quotes that interviewees closely monitor the paths of
storms via television. When news reports showed tornadoes dangerously close,
interviewees would then either take action or seek additional information.
Interviewees revealed that hearing of tornados touching down in nearby
communities prompted protective action. One interviewee claims, “When we saw
the storm was, was going through this other community of Billings and I knew
that the storm…would just… if it missed us by any, it wouldn’t miss us by much.
We decided just to go ahead and go to the shelter, where it’s partially
underground and we kind of just kind of felt more comfortable under there” [QRMO-5].
There are, however, a variety of social factors that can limit one’s ability
to track storms effectively. Recent immigrants may gain the least benefit from
tracking storms. For example, immigrants may be unfamiliar with the locations
of towns or cities in new areas and may therefore be unable to determine the exact
location of the tornado. New or recent residents may not experience similar
feelings of risk upon hearing that the town of “Billings” or any other geographic
benchmark will be impacted by a hazard event, as they are more than likely
unfamiliar with their new and surrounding communities.
Specific or General Warnings?
Related to tracking storms, interviewees are in some cases barraged by
information. Warnings are conveyed through the internet, television, and radio
(and, in some cases, NOAA weather radio). However, the focus on multiple
sources of information has not resulted in a commensurate concern over how
warnings are worded. As far as content goes, in our conversations with
interviewees one particular piece of information stood out as vital, especially with
long-term residents. The found references to towns or landmarks in warning
reports of key importance when deciding to respond (which, again, may help only
long-term residents and be of little use to recent immigrants). One interviewee
remarked on a lack of specificity he found in weather information: “It was just
[a] typical watch broad area map showing pretty much hundreds of counties,
doesn’t really, a lot of times doesn’t really get effected, you know it doesn’t really
get a rise out of anyone because I think it’s just so widespread most of the time”
[QR-MO-6].
The mention of specific towns or geographic locations seemed very
important to some interviewees. This may have been for two reasons. First, local
communities are more familiar and make threats seem more personalized.
Envisioning a tornado destroying something familiar may be more distressing -
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and therefore more likely to warrant response - than the destruction of something
unfamiliar or remote. Second, nearby communities act as more concrete
reference points on which to base a decision. One thing that we know from the
literature is that more specific warnings are taken more seriously (Perry, Lindell,
and Greene 1981). Based on this premise, we might view as suspect warnings
that are too broad or only include measurements of distance (e.g., "the tornado is
10 miles to the east"). Hearing that a tornado is 10 miles away from a familiar
community gives a far clearer psychological or emotional reference point. One
interviewee summed up the problem of specificity nicely: “The siren goes off so
many times, we had sirens go off and a tornado nowhere near us, it was in
Dyersburg but you know they spotted one in Dyersburg so the sirens go off here
to warn us to take cover. Well, you know, I’m not gonna go lock myself and my
husband up in a closet for an hour wondering if this thing’s passed [QR-TN-11].
Another problem one interviewee encountered was deciding which piece
of information in a warning to respond to. Confronted with the possibility of hail
or tornadoes, one interviewee tellingly remarks: “Right, well that’s what I
thought. Matter of fact when I heard that there was hail, my mind said, ‘oh hail
instead of tornado.’ Which makes it okay to run out and move your car cause I’ll
brave the hail, not an F-3 tornado 500 feet away.” [QR-MO-8]. In some cases,
warning recipients may be more concerned with protecting private property than
personal safety.
Local Business Behaviors
For some time, sociologists of disaster have known that environmental cues
prompt people to action (Hammer and Schmidlin 2002; Mileti and Fitzpatrick
1993; Tierney 1987). When asked why they decided to seek shelter, a common
response from interviewees is, “I saw debris flying,” or “felt pressure in the ears,”
or “I saw the tornado.” Rarely considered, however, is how the “social
environment” influences the decision to protect oneself. In many cases, seeing
others evacuating or preparing to evacuate causes people to do the same. A sense
of urgency and timeliness is transmitted in such situations.
Businesses are a part of this “social environment” and appear influential in
the process of community risk perception. The operation of businesses during
periods of severe weather seems to convey a sense that everything is normal and
that no immediate risk presents itself. People are likely to patronize local
businesses that remain open during warnings, as witnessed with a local Pizza Hut
and a Casino in this study. In extreme cases, patrons may even protest the closure
of businesses despite the severe weather. Most notably, Caruthersville is home to
a floating casino docked on the Mississippi River. Interviewees on the boat and
the bartender claimed that during the storm gamblers would not seek shelter.
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Solutions to this problem, however, may be difficult to envision, due to
issues of legality and potential loss of revenue as a result of temporary closure.
Even if local emergency managers conceivably could force businesses to close,
the economic impacts and the backlash from an angry community for doing so
would still be problematic.
Cultural Myths
Educational efforts traditionally seek to explain the meaning of watches and
warnings and to instruct the public on appropriate responses to tornadoes. Few
attempts have been made, however, to alter the often-mistaken popular knowledge
communities hold on the subject of tornado climatology (for a general discussion
of disaster myths, see Fischer 2008). A path we might take towards improving
public response would involve countering the cultural myths that cause people to
either: a) disbelieve tornadoes will form (“tornadoes can’t form in the
mountains”), or b) depersonalize risk (“there is a tornado but it cannot pass the
river and specifically harm us”).
Upon analysis, a typology of tornado myths emerged - myths may be
categorized as geographic, demographic, or related to perceived hazard frequency.
Although one interviewee clearly knew a tornado was present, she nevertheless
believed the region's mountains offered protection from severe weather [MO-MO2]. Another interviewee reflects this concern: “I had told a couple friends of
mine that live in the country about it. I told ‘em I said, you know, ya’ll may get hit
cuz ya’ll in a flat plain area” [QR-NO-14]. Demographically, one interviewee
held that “I never heard of that [it could come through a city] you know being in
urban areas.” [QR-NO-13]. Hazard frequency myths, on the other hand, worked
to deny the possibly of uncommon threats. For instance, in New Orleans one
interviewee remarked, “I didn’t even expect a tornado so I didn’t know what it
was capable of. All I know is hurricanes. If they only say hurricane watch I knew
I had to get out. I know about the hurricanes you know. But tornado I just I
never” [QR-NO-13].
Discussion and Policy
In this study, we have attempted to develop categories explaining behaviors and
attitudes towards warnings. In summary, we found that social networks, language
barriers, confusion about warning messages, false alarms, local business
behaviors, and cultural myths played key roles in the reception,
acknowledgement, and use of risk information. From this, we synthesize five
policy suggestions that might help improve warning response and prevent
fatalities and injuries.
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Encourage and Facilitate Minority Community Leadership
With respect to non-English-speaking communities, of which Hispanics are the
most sizable in the United States, two courses of action are necessary. First,
emergency managers should develop an institutionalized means of engagement
with minority community leadership. Second, along with English-language
warnings, communities should strongly consider issuing Spanish-language
warnings as well.
On the first point, in considering minority communities, especially recent
immigrants, emergency managers and policymakers should ask themselves the
following questions: Who is important in the minority community and who
generally takes on an emergent leadership role in periods of crisis? How are the
groups and their leadership organized? Do significant language barriers exist?
What do these groups commonly do during a disaster?
Coordination,
communication, and training are only possible when emergency managers “tap
into” these networks to truly understand how they function.
Minority
communities often lack the language skills and connections to conventional
institutions necessary for organized response.
Minority leadership helps
compensate for these problems and should therefore be facilitated. Doing so
might involve, for example, providing computers, communications equipment,
and transportation to these leaders so that they might more effectively
communicate safety information. Enabling these roles will be a crucial step in the
development of effective warning policies.
On the second point, the case of Verona further calls for a greater dialogue
on the necessity of Spanish-language warnings. To date, few—if any—
jurisdictions offer Spanish-language warnings regardless of the number of Latinos
living in the community. It was clear from interviews in Verona that the absence
of Spanish-language warnings prevented effective sheltering and response among
the Hispanic population. An additional Spanish-language warning describing the
situation, what to do, and where to seek shelter would likely improve response
among this community.
Educate to Target Cultural Myths and False Alarms
Targeted education campaigns are necessary to overcome problems created by
cultural myths and false alarms. Changing these beliefs will be difficult because
many of these myths appear tightly woven into the cultural fabric of communities.
The public does not understand the meanings of false alarms as intended by
forecasters, emergency managers, and scientists. The public often sees warnings
as either “hit” or “miss,” whereas those responsible for issuing and creating
warnings view success in terms of probabilities or objective mathematical
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outcomes. If a warning is issued and no tornado appears, this will be considered a
“false alarm” by many among the public even if the tornado had a very strong
chance of striking the community. Informing the public about how warnings are
developed may reduce perceptions of the false alarm rate, and perhaps the
resulting doubt about the credibility of warnings faced by many communities.
On the other hand, tornado myths should be addressed in two ways. First,
there are those tornado myths that are general – for instance, the myth that the
safest spot is in the southwest corner of the house. These should be generally
addressed in all public service announcements. However, local emergency
management planning committees should also acknowledge local cultural myths
that threaten the community. For instance, interviewees living near rivers often
held the belief that they were somehow protected from tornadoes, as did those
who lived in areas of high elevation where it was believed that tornadoes could
not pass through mountains. Others doubted that tornadoes could enter urban
areas for a host of reasons. Targeting these local myths through education may
have a positive impact on public response.
Reconsider the Language of Watches and Warnings
Noted earlier, one interviewee was unable to distinguish watches from warnings.
This is troubling given that the literature reports the need for clear and consistent
messages if warnings are to elicit response. According to NWS operational
definitions, “watches” imply the potential for the development of severe weather;
“warnings,” on the other hand, signal the presence of tornadoes. To the public,
however, the meaning of either term may be dramatically different. Nothing
within the words “watch” or “warning” inherently imply, beyond a
meteorological context, more or less danger. Thus, individuals may confuse
warnings with watches and vice-versa or simply fail to grasp their significance.
There may be two solutions to this problem. The most dramatic is to discontinue
the use of the terms “watch” and “warning.” Doing so would then necessitate the
creation of an alternative rubric through which to communicate different levels of
threat. Alternatively, we may opt to preserve the language of watches and
warnings with the intention of continuously educating the public as to their
meanings and use. Education should most likely focus on helping communities
understand a) the sequence of watches and warnings, b) the level of risk watches
and warnings alternatively convey, and c) the type of meteorological conditions
each alert implies.
If the public continues to ignore the distinction, we may encounter future
difficulties in issuing warnings. The repeated issuing of tornado watches may
artificially inflate the perceived false alarm rate among communities, especially
among those either unable or unwilling to differentiate between watches and
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warnings. Watches have a much higher false alarm rate given that they are based
on initial meteorological data. Thus watches, which routinely “fail” to predict
tornadoes, may therefore unintentionally be working to increase skepticism
towards warning systems in general.
Advise Local Business
A sense of "normality" remained when businesses were open during periods of
warning. Local emergency managers may call for the closure of public
institutions, but the closure of private business remains a legal grey area. One
solution might be for emergency managers to petition local businesses to close
during periods of warning or siren soundings. The effect would be two-fold.
First, members of the community would have fewer reasons for exiting their
homes during periods of warning. Second, closure would create a heightened
sense of urgency among local communities and would serve to further reinforce
the notion of danger.
The problem with this policy course would be potential economic impacts.
In communities where tornadoes are rare, the occasional closing of businesses
would have little impact on the economy. Yet communities that experience a
higher number of tornadoes may feel deeper and broader economic impacts under
policies of forced closure. Therefore, communication and coordination with local
businesses is necessary to find balance between public safety and the economic
needs of communities.
Unambiguous Siren Tones
One specific problem noted in New Orleans was that sirens alerted to multiple
events (e.g., tornadoes and chemical spills). Solutions to the problem vary with
the nature of the threats communities faced coupled with the availability of
resources. Ideally, sirens should be used only for tornados. In cases where
communities face multiple threats, different tones for different events, in
conjunction with a sustained public education program, may present solutions to
this problem.
Conclusion
Given the variety of causes and potential solutions, emergency managers should
explore why these factors emerge and to what extent they are affecting the
members of their community. We explored several reasons in this study, ranging
from immigration to the functioning of businesses to language barriers. Perhaps
some means of surveying can be developed whereby local residents could express
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their needs and concerns about the problems they routinely confront during
periods of warning. This would allow local emergency managers to identify more
precisely the specific needs of their constituent groups. There is no simple “onesize-fits-all” solution to the matter; each community is unique. We must therefore
develop diverse solutions that recognize that no two communities are alike and.
furthermore that there is a great diversity of need present within communities due
to variation in socioeconomic status, culture, and race, as well as the
psychological and social-psychological patterns that appear during periods of
crisis. Coming to view severe weather as both an environmental and social
problem will allow us to take steps towards addressing a host of response issues.
Academically, future research should explore several issues related to
community and warning response.
One area we feel demands further
investigation is the role of local businesses and institutions in shaping warning
response. Another area of research should focus on how local leaders of minority
communities emerge and how they manage risk information within these
communities. Finally, how the public perceives false alarms vis-à-vis the NWS
also would yield additional theoretical and policy insights.
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